Tax morale and the role of social norms and reciprocity evidence from a randomized survey experiment Philipp Doerrenberg and Andreas Peichl
By: Doerrenberg, Philipp
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Contributor(s): Peichl, Andreas
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Material type: 



Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 207/2022/1/2-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 207/2022/1/2-2 |
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
We present the results of a survey (with randomized components) on tax compliance. The experimental component of our survey allows us to investigate the role of social norms and reciprocity for tax morale. We find that a social-norm treatment reduces tax morale, while a reciprocity treatment has a positive effect. This suggests that a potential backfire effect of social norms is outweighed if the consequences of violating the social norm are made salient in an appeal to reciprocity. We further document the anatomy of tax morale and present novel evidence about the role of risk and patience for tax morale.
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