Election cycles in European public procurement Annika Havlik, Friedrich Heinemann and Justus Nover
By: Havlik, Annika
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Contributor(s): Heinemann, Friedrich | Nover, Justus.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2021Subject(s): CONTRATOS ADMINISTRATIVOS | CONCESIONES ADMINISTRATIVAS | GASTO PUBLICO | ELECCIONES | VOTO | UNION EUROPEA | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
FinanzArchiv v. 77, n. 4, December 2021, p. 376-407Summary: We study the existence of election cycles in public procurement in the European Union. Along the procurement process, we separately analyze contract notices, contract awards, and project completions. We point out how these steps differ in their potential to address specific voter types. We argue that the award is particularly appealing for politicians. It allows them to please the award-winning firms' stakeholders and the spending decision becomes credible from the perspective of forward-looking voters. We find robust evidence for electioneering in contract notices and awards. The effect in awards is stronger for certain sub-categories like education and more visible projects.
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Resumen.
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We study the existence of election cycles in public procurement in the European Union. Along the procurement process, we separately analyze contract notices, contract awards, and project completions. We point out how these steps differ in their potential to address specific voter types. We argue that the award is particularly appealing for politicians. It allows them to please the award-winning firms' stakeholders and the spending decision becomes credible from the perspective of forward-looking voters. We find robust evidence for electioneering in contract notices and awards. The effect in awards is stronger for certain sub-categories like education and more visible projects.
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