Bespoke tax rulings and profit shifting in the European Union assessing the EU’s options Shafi U Khan Niazi and Richard Krever
By: Niazi, Shafi U Khan
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Contributor(s): Krever, Richard E
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Material type: 







Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 1867/2021/3-3 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 1867/2021/3-3 |
Resumen.
Widely publicised profit-shifting cases in Europe against multinationals such as Starbucks, Fiat, Apple and Amazon have caught the attention of Australian scholars and tax officials with the revelation of the direct involvement of Australian subsidiaries such as Apple in the arrangements. The profit-shifting arrangements in question are all based on favourable private rulings from tax authorities in a select group of European countries. While in theory European Union (EU) authorities have three potential weapons that can be used to attack the arrangements, to date, the European initiatives to attack the profit-shifting schemes have focused on one primarily, the EU prohibition against state aid.
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