Mandatory binding arbitration avoiding stalemates over the tax chessboard Polyvios Nikolaou
By: Nikolaou, Polyvios
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2021Subject(s): FISCALIDAD INTERNACIONAL | TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES | RESOLUCIONES EXTRAJUDICIALES DE CONFLICTOS | ARBITRAJE
In:
Intertax v. 49, n. 12, December 2021, p. 974-985Summary: The resolution of tax treaty disputes under the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) mechanism is inherently problematic. This article examines how the introduction of final-offer arbitration (FOA) can improve dispute resolution using a game-theoretical approach. It will be argued that arbitration introduces an element of finality that was demonstrably absent in the MAP while also contributing to the speedier resolution of disputes which is beneficial to all international stakeholders. After demonstrating the advantages of arbitration, the paper considers how its institutional design can be optimized in the tax context. It makes proposals regarding the publication of arbitral decisions to address concerns of countries that are still skeptical about whether or not to endorse it.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 2141/2021/12-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 2141/2021/12-2 |
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| OP 2141/2021/1-2 The 2020 Pillar Two blueprint | OP 2141/2021/12 Intertax | OP 2141/2021/12-1 Time to tax | OP 2141/2021/12-2 Mandatory binding arbitration | OP 2141/2021/12-3 Can the switch-over rule and the role of permanent establishments be considered the neglected stepchildren of the GloBE proposal? | OP 2141/2021/12-4 Critical review of the ATAD implementation | OP 2141/2021/12-5 CFC conundrum |
Resumen.
The resolution of tax treaty disputes under the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) mechanism is inherently problematic. This article examines how the introduction of final-offer arbitration (FOA) can improve dispute resolution using a game-theoretical approach. It will be argued that arbitration introduces an element of finality that was demonstrably absent in the MAP while also contributing to the speedier resolution of disputes which is beneficial to all international stakeholders. After demonstrating the advantages of arbitration, the paper considers how its institutional design can be optimized in the tax context. It makes proposals regarding the publication of arbitral decisions to address concerns of countries that are still skeptical about whether or not to endorse it.
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