Collaborative tax evasion in the provision of services to consumers a field experiment Annabelle Doerr, Sarah Necker
By: Doerr, Annabelle
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Contributor(s): Necker, Sarah.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2021Subject(s): INDUSTRIA DE SERVICIOS | IMPUESTOS | EVASION FISCAL | CONSUMIDORES | ALEMANIA
In:
American Economic Journal : Economic Policy v. 13, n. 4, November 2021, p. 185-216Summary: We conduct a field experiment with sellers of home improvement services on two German online markets. We take the role of consumers and vary whether we request an invoice for the delivery of the service. In a market that allows anyone to sell anonymously, a willingness to evade is prevalent. In a market that keeps track of credentials, sellers are only willing to evade when a willingness to collude is signaled. The evasion discount is in most estimates not larger than the tax subsidy for legal demand. Evasion is unlikely to be beneficial for many consumers in our setting.
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| OP 2135/2021/4 American Economic Journal : Economic Policy | OP 2135/2021/4-1 The Internet as a tax haven? | OP 2135/2021/4-2 Corporate taxation under weak enforcement | OP 2135/2021/4-3 Collaborative tax evasion in the provision of services to consumers | OP 2135/2021/4-4 Market power and income taxation | OP 2135/2021/4-5 Fiscal tansfers in the spatial economy | OP 2135/2021/4-6 Do value-added taxes affect international trade flows? |
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We conduct a field experiment with sellers of home improvement services on two German online markets. We take the role of consumers and vary whether we request an invoice for the delivery of the service. In a market that allows anyone to sell anonymously, a willingness to evade is prevalent. In a market that keeps track of credentials, sellers are only willing to evade when a willingness to collude is signaled. The evasion discount is in most estimates not larger than the tax subsidy for legal demand. Evasion is unlikely to be beneficial for many consumers in our setting.
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