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Voting systems and fiscal policy evidence from runoff and plurality elections Davide Cipullo

By: Cipullo, Davide.
Material type: ArticleArticlePublisher: 2021Subject(s): POLITICA FISCAL | MUNICIPIOS | ELECCIONES | SISTEMA ELECTORAL | VOTO | ITALIA | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS In: National Tax Journal v. 74, n. 2, June 2021, p. 347-376Summary: This paper compares policy outcomes under the runoff voting system and the plurality rule by exploiting the assignment of municipalities in Italy to different voting systems based on a population threshold. Mayors, who are the head of the local political power, are elected using a plurality rule in municipalities having fewer than 15,000 residents, while they are elected using a runoff system in municipalities above the threshold. Regression-discontinuity estimates show that municipalities under the runoff system spend 12 percent more than those under the plurality rule and that additional expenditures are not financed via higher taxation.
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This paper compares policy outcomes under the runoff voting system and the plurality rule by exploiting the assignment of municipalities in Italy to different voting systems based on a population threshold. Mayors, who are the head of the local political power, are elected using a plurality rule in municipalities having fewer than 15,000 residents, while they are elected using a runoff system in municipalities above the threshold. Regression-discontinuity estimates show that municipalities under the runoff system spend 12 percent more than those under the plurality rule and that additional expenditures are not financed via higher taxation.

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