Structural budget balance as a fiscal rule in the European Union good, bad, or ugly? Ringa Raudla and James W. Douglas
By: Raudla, Ringa
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Contributor(s): Douglas, James W.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2021Subject(s): CUENTAS PRESUPUESTARIAS | ESTABILIDAD PRESUPUESTARIA | ARMONIZACION | ARMONIZACION FISCAL | UNION EUROPEA
In:
Public Budgeting and Finance v. 41, n. 1, Spring 2021, p. 121-141Summary: The EU's Fiscal Compact requires member states to legislate structural budget balance rule(s) (SBR). We use elite interviews and government documents from Austria, Ireland, and Portugal to assess the extent to which SBRs are perceived to have resulted in improved accountability, coordination, and credible commitment on the part of elected officials. We find that establishing the SBRs in legislation has not resulted in domestic ownership on the part of the member states. Furthermore, SBRs do not appear to have improved accountability due to questions about their accuracy. There is some evidence that SBRs aid finance ministries' coordination efforts.
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| OP 1716/2021/1 Public Budgeting and Finance | OP 1716/2021/1-1 Fiscal decentralization and natural disaster mitigation | OP 1716/2021/1-2 The adoption of local option fuel taxes | OP 1716/2021/1-3 Structural budget balance as a fiscal rule in the European Union | OP 1716/2021/2 Public Budgeting and Finance | OP 1716/2021/2-1 Learning from the Joneses | OP 1716/2021/2-2 Stringency of balanced budget laws and transparency of budgeting process |
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The EU's Fiscal Compact requires member states to legislate structural budget balance rule(s) (SBR). We use elite interviews and government documents from Austria, Ireland, and Portugal to assess the extent to which SBRs are perceived to have resulted in improved accountability, coordination, and credible commitment on the part of elected officials. We find that establishing the SBRs in legislation has not resulted in domestic ownership on the part of the member states. Furthermore, SBRs do not appear to have improved accountability due to questions about their accuracy. There is some evidence that SBRs aid finance ministries' coordination efforts.
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