A citizen-candidate model of tax competition with interdependent preferences Satoshi Kasamatsu, Taku Masuda, Hikaru Ogawa
By: Kasamatsu, Satoshi
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Contributor(s): Masuda, Taku | Ogawa, Hikaru.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2020Subject(s): COMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA | POLITICOS | ELECCIONES | VOTO | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOSOnline resources: Click here to access online
In:
FinanzArchiv v. 76, n. 4, December 2020, p. 313-328Summary: In a citizen-candidate model of tax competition, this study describes the emergence of a policymaker (political leader) that has a hostile or altruistic stance toward neighboring countries. The results show that (i) when countries competing for mobile capital have similar positions on the import/export of capital, an altruistic citizen will be elected as the political leader, and (ii) when their capital positions differ, a citizen that has malicious preferences can become the representative of the country.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 207/2020/4-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 207/2020/4-1 |
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In a citizen-candidate model of tax competition, this study describes the emergence of a policymaker (political leader) that has a hostile or altruistic stance toward neighboring countries. The results show that (i) when countries competing for mobile capital have similar positions on the import/export of capital, an altruistic citizen will be elected as the political leader, and (ii) when their capital positions differ, a citizen that has malicious preferences can become the representative of the country.
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