Fiscal policy with limited time commitment Alex Clymo and Andrea Lanteri
By: Clymo, Alex
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Contributor(s): Lanteri, Andrea
.
Material type: 



Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 282/2020/627-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 282/2020/627-1 |
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Resumen.
Bibliografía.
We propose a theory of optimal fiscal policy with ‘Limited-Time Commitment’. In our framework, successive governments have commitment only over finite, overlapping horizons. We first show that key results in the ‘Full Commitment’ literature can often be sustained with a single period of commitment. We then solve a calibrated model in which ‘Limited-Time Commitment’ fails to implement the ‘Full Commitment’ policy, and find that one year (three years) of commitment recovers one-third (two-thirds) of the welfare losses relative to ‘No Commitment’. Finally, we investigate the trade-off between commitment and flexibility in response to shocks.
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