Interlocal collaboration and local fiscal structure do state incentives matter? Sungho Park, Craig S. Maher and Carol Ebdon
By: Park, Sungho
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Contributor(s): Maher, Craig S
| Ebdon, Carol
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Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 1716/2020/2-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 1716/2020/2-1 |
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OP 1716/2020/1-2 Assessing the financial impact of natural disasters on local governments | OP 1716/2020/1-3 Predicting TIF distress | OP 1716/2020/2 Public Budgeting and Finance | OP 1716/2020/2-1 Interlocal collaboration and local fiscal structure | OP 1716/2020/3 Public Budgeting and Finance | OP 1716/2020/3-1 Who is afraid of the big bad debt? | OP 1716/2020/3-2 Sovereign currency and non‐sovereign budgets |
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Interlocal collaboration is considered an important tool for cost‐saving. States, therefore, have incentivized interlocal collaboration in different ways. To understand the budgetary consequences of interlocal collaboration and state incentives, we examine counties in Nebraska where the State uses two incentive mechanisms—resource restrictions and additional access to restricted revenues granted to counties with collaboration. This study finds that county expenditures are lower when they spend more through collaboration. While this lower spending is related to lower revenues in counties less constrained by state restrictions, the results for counties more constrained are unclear. State incentive structures may matter for such variations.
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