Optimal taxation with behavioral agents by Emmanuel Farhi and Xavier Gabaix
By: Farhi, Emmanuel
.
Contributor(s): Gabaix, Xavier
.
Material type: 


Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 234/2020/1-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 234/2020/1-2 |
Browsing IEF Shelves Close shelf browser
No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | ||
OP 234/2020/1-1 Positive long - run capital taxation | OP 234/2020/11 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2020/11-1 How well targeted are soda taxes? | OP 234/2020/1-2 Optimal taxation with behavioral agents | OP 234/2020/12 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2020/2 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2020/3 The American Economic Review |
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
This paper develops a theory of optimal taxation with behavioral agents. We use a general framework that encompasses a wide range of biases such as misperceptions and internalities. We revisit the three pillars of optimal taxation: Ramsey (linear commodity taxation to raise revenues and redistribute), Pigou (linear commodity taxation to correct externalities), and Mirrlees (nonlinear income taxation). We show how the canonical optimal tax formulas are modified and lead to novel economic insights. We also show how to incorporate nudges in the optimal taxation framework, and jointly characterize optimal taxes and nudges.
There are no comments for this item.