Consumers as tax auditors by Joana Naritomi
By: Naritomi, Joana
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2019Subject(s): IMPUESTOS INDIRECTOS | ELUSION FISCAL | INFORMACION TRIBUTARIA | AUDITORIA FISCAL | INSPECCION TRIBUTARIA | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
The American Economic Review v. 109. n. 9, September 2019, p. 3031-3072 Summary: To investigate the enforcement value of third-party information on potentially collusive taxpayers, I study an anti-tax evasion program that rewards consumers for ensuring that firms report sales and establishes a verification system to aid whistle-blowing consumers in Sao Paulo, Brazil (Nota Fiscal Paulista). Firms reported sales increased by at least 21 percent over 4 years. The results are consistent with fixed costs of concealing collusion, increased detection probability from whistle-blower threats, and with behavioral biases associated with lotteries amplifying the enforcement value of the program. Although firms increased reported expenses, tax revenue net of rewards increased by 9.3 percent.
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| OP 234/2019/8 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2019/8-1 Comparing UK tax returns of foreign multinationals to matche domestic firms | OP 234/2019/9 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2019/9-1 Consumers as tax auditors | OP 234/2019/May-1 The American Economic Association | OP 234/2020/1 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2020/10 The American Economic Review |
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
To investigate the enforcement value of third-party information on potentially collusive taxpayers, I study an anti-tax evasion program that rewards consumers for ensuring that firms report sales and establishes a verification system to aid whistle-blowing consumers in Sao Paulo, Brazil (Nota Fiscal Paulista). Firms reported sales increased by at least 21 percent over 4 years. The results are consistent with fixed costs of concealing collusion, increased detection probability from whistle-blower threats, and with behavioral biases associated with lotteries amplifying the enforcement value of the program. Although firms increased reported expenses, tax revenue net of rewards increased by 9.3 percent.
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