The returns to lobbying evidence from local Governments in the " age of earmarks " Steve Gordon
By: Gordon, Steven
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2019Subject(s): HACIENDAS LOCALES | POLITICA ECONOMICA | COOPERACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA | ESTADOS UNIDOSOnline resources: Click here to access online
In:
Public Finance Review v. 47, n. 5, September 2019, p. 893-924Summary: I measure the returns to lobbying for US local governments in terms of
federal earmarks. Because a local government’s decision to lobby may be
endogenous to receiving an earmark, I instrument for lobbying with local
housing prices. Since the time period of my analysis covers the Housing
Crisis, I argue that the variation in housing prices over this time was largely
exogenous to federal earmark distributions. The strong correlation that I find
between housing price growth rates and lobbying provides evidence that
local governments lobbied to buffer against impending property tax losses.
I find no evidence that lobbying is associated with increased earmark awards
overall. However, conditional on selection into receiving an earmark, I do find
evidence that lobbying served to increase the size of earmark awards.
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| OP 581/2019/5-1 The mortgage interest deduction | OP 581/2019/5-2 Poverty and savings | OP 581/2019/5-3 Political economy of the parcel tax in California school districts | OP 581/2019/5-4 The returns to lobbying | OP 581/2019/5-5 The income tax compliance costs of private households | OP 581/2019/6 Public Finance Review | OP 581/2019/6-1 Distributional impacts of state and local tax policy in a heterogeneous agent model |
Disponible también en formato electrónico en la Biblioteca del IEF.
Bibliografía.
I measure the returns to lobbying for US local governments in terms of
federal earmarks. Because a local government’s decision to lobby may be
endogenous to receiving an earmark, I instrument for lobbying with local
housing prices. Since the time period of my analysis covers the Housing
Crisis, I argue that the variation in housing prices over this time was largely
exogenous to federal earmark distributions. The strong correlation that I find
between housing price growth rates and lobbying provides evidence that
local governments lobbied to buffer against impending property tax losses.
I find no evidence that lobbying is associated with increased earmark awards
overall. However, conditional on selection into receiving an earmark, I do find
evidence that lobbying served to increase the size of earmark awards.
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