Disponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.

Resumen.

Bibliografía.

We study the design of provider incentives in the post-acute care setting—a highstakes but under-studied segment of the healthcare system.We focus on long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) and the large (approximately $13,500) jump in Medicare payments they receive when a patient’s stay reaches a threshold number of days. Discharges increase substantially after the threshold, with the marginal discharged patient in relatively
better health. Despite the large financial incentives and behavioral response in a high mortality population, we are unable to detect any compelling evidence of an impact
on patient mortality. To assess provider behavior under counterfactual payment schedules, we estimate a simple dynamic discrete choice model of LTCH discharge decisions.
When we conservatively limit ourselves to alternative contracts that hold the LTCH harmless, we find that an alternative contract can generate Medicare savings of about $2,100 per admission, or about 5% of total payments. More aggressive payment
reforms can generate substantially greater savings, but the accompanying reduction in consequences. Our results highlight how improved financial incentives may be able to reduce healthcare spending, without negative consequences for industry profits or patient health.