Hesitating at the Altar : an update on taxes and the timing of marriage Nick Frazier and Margaret McKeehan
By: Frazier, Nick
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Contributor(s): Mackeehan, Margaret.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2018Subject(s): UNIDAD FAMILIAR | MATRIMONIO | IMPUESTOS | INCENTIVOS FISCALES | ESTADOS UNIDOSOnline resources: Click here to access online
In:
Public Finance Review v. 46, n. 5, September 2018, p. 743-763Summary: This article provides evidence that the US tax code’s dependence on marital status continues to generate an implicit marriage tax and distort marital decisions. By looking at the timing of marriage rather than the decision to marry, we capture a specific distortion while allowing for heterogeneity in other costs of marriage. Using data on couples from the Panel Study
on Income Dynamics between 1986 and 2011, we find that a 1 percent rise in the size of the marriage tax relative to a couple’s income increases the probability of delay by 1.2 percentage points. We further demonstrate the robustness of this result across a variety of alternative specifications and assumptions regarding tax-filing behavior.
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| OP 581/2018/4-3 The effect of fiscal illusion on public sector financial management | OP 581/2018/4-4 The politics of checkbook federalism | OP 581/2018/5 Public Finance Review | OP 581/2018/5-1 Hesitating at the Altar | OP 581/2018/5-2 Tax compliance costs | OP 581/2018/5-3 The fiscal effects of the work-related tax expenditures in Europe | OP 581/2018/5-4 The fiscal impacts of alternative land uses |
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This article provides evidence that the US tax code’s dependence on marital status continues to generate an implicit marriage tax and distort marital decisions. By looking at the timing of marriage rather than the decision to marry, we capture a specific distortion while allowing for heterogeneity in other costs of marriage. Using data on couples from the Panel Study
on Income Dynamics between 1986 and 2011, we find that a 1 percent rise in the size of the marriage tax relative to a couple’s income increases the probability of delay by 1.2 percentage points. We further demonstrate the robustness of this result across a variety of alternative specifications and assumptions regarding tax-filing behavior.
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