Pay-as-you-go pension, bargaining power and fertility Mizuki Komura and Hikaru Ogawa
By: Komura, Mizuki
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Contributor(s): Ogawa, Hikaru
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Material type: 





Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 207/2018/2-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 207/2018/2-2 |
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OP 207/2018/1-2 Real firms in tax systems | OP 207/2018/2 FinanzArchiv | OP 207/2018/2-1 EMU and the size of the Public Sector | OP 207/2018/2-2 Pay-as-you-go pension, bargaining power and fertility | OP 207/2018/3 FinanzArchiv | OP 207/2018/3-1 Welfare-improving consumption tax in the presence of a wage tax under idiosyncratic returns from investment and incomplete markets | OP 207/2018/3-2 Investors' portfolio choice and tax reforms |
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Resumen.
Bibliografía.
The effects of pension policies on fertility have been examined in the overlapping-generations (OLG) model of the unitary household in which no heterogeneity exists between
wife and husband. This study departs from the OLG model to focus on marital bargaining arising from heterogeneity in a nonunitary model. Specifically, this paper examines
how pension policies affect the fertility of a bargaining couple with different life spans. The analysis reveals a new channel from pension policies to fertility decisions, whereby an increase in pension size affects fertility not only via the changes in current
and future income but also through a change in marital bargaining power. This result suggests that an increase in a pay-as-you-go pension may induce a negative effect on fertility through women’s empowerment.
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