Fiscal centralization Theory and evidence from the Great Depression by Daniele Coen-Pirani and Michael Wooley
By: Coen Pirani, Daniele
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Contributor(s): Wooley, Michael
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Material type: 





Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 2135/2018/2-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 2135/2018/2-1 |
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OP 2135/2018/1 American Economic Journal : Economic Policy | OP 2135/2018/1-1 Under the radar | OP 2135/2018/2 American Economic Journal : Economic Policy | OP 2135/2018/2-1 Fiscal centralization | OP 2135/2018/2-2 Cash-on-hand and college enrollment | OP 2135/2018/2-3 The effect of corporate taxation on investment and financial policy | OP 2135/2018/3 American Economic Journal : Economic Policy |
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Resumen.
Bibliografía.
The Great Depression produced a profound and lasting influence on the structure of US government. This paper studies theoretically and empirically the increased centralization of revenues and expenditures by the states relative to local governments during this period. A model of property and sales taxation and tax delinquency is introduced. In the model, the income decline of the Depression causes a rise in property tax delinquency and leads to a shift toward sales taxation and fiscal centralization by the states. Empirical evidence based on cross-state variation in the severity of the Depression is consistent with the model’s key predictions.
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