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An equilibrium model of tax compliance with a bayesian auditor and some "honest" tax payers

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Social Sc. Working Paper;506.Publisher: Pasadena California Institute of Technology 1984Description: 19 h. gráf. 22 cm. (apaisado).Subject(s): CUMPLIMIENTO FISCAL

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Item type	Current location	Home library	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode
Libros		IEF	C 488-10694 (Browse shelf)	Available		C 488-10694
Libros		IEF	C 795-14998 (Browse shelf)	Available		C 795-14998

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Previous	C 794-14995 Social efficiency : a concise introduction to welfare Economics	C 794-14996 Equality and efficiency	C 795-14997 A model of tax compliance with budget-constrained auditors	C 795-14998 An equilibrium model of tax compliance with a bayesian auditor and some "honest" tax payers	C 795-14999 Marx et l'argent	C 795-15000 Economic development and international trade	C 795-15001 Finance Bill : handbook... with commentary	Next

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