An equilibrium model of tax compliance with a bayesian auditor and some "honest" tax payers
By: Graetz, Michael J.
Material type: TextSeries: Social Sc. Working Paper;506.Publisher: Pasadena California Institute of Technology 1984Description: 19 h. gráf. 22 cm. (apaisado).Subject(s): CUMPLIMIENTO FISCALItem type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Libros | IEF | C 488-10694 (Browse shelf) | Available | C 488-10694 | ||
Libros | IEF | C 795-14998 (Browse shelf) | Available | C 795-14998 |
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Bibliografía. -- Resumen
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