The right type of legislator a theory of taxation and representation Andrea Mattozzi, Erik Snowberg
By: Mattozzi, Andrera
.
Contributor(s): Snowberg, Erik.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2018Subject(s): POLITICA FISCAL | ELECCIONES | POLITICA DE GASTO PUBLICO | REDISTRIBUCION | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOSOnline resources: Click here to access online
In:
Journal of Public Economics n. 159, 2018, p. 54-65Summary: We develop a theory of taxation and the distribution of government spending in a citizen-candidate model of
legislatures. Individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions: productive ability in the private sector and negotiating
ability in politics. When these are positively correlated, rich voters always prefer a rich legislator, but poor voters face a trade-off. A rich legislator will secure more pork for the district, but will also prefer lower taxation than the poor voter. Our theory organizes a number of stylized facts across countries about taxation and redistribution, parties, and class representation in legislatures. We demonstrate that spending does not necessarily
increase when the number of legislators increases, as the standard common-pool intuition suggests, and that many policies aimed at increasing descriptive representation may have the opposite effect.
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| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 730/2018/159-3 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 730/2018/159-3 |
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| OP 730/2018/158 Journal of Public Economics | OP 730/2018/159 Journal of Public Economics | OP 730/2018/159-2 The effects of collecting income taxes on social security benefits | OP 730/2018/159-3 The right type of legislator | OP 730/2018/160 Journal of Public Economics | OP 730/2018/160-1 Tax compliance and fiscal externalities | OP 730/2018/161 Journal of Public Economics |
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Resumen.
Bibliografía.
We develop a theory of taxation and the distribution of government spending in a citizen-candidate model of
legislatures. Individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions: productive ability in the private sector and negotiating
ability in politics. When these are positively correlated, rich voters always prefer a rich legislator, but poor voters face a trade-off. A rich legislator will secure more pork for the district, but will also prefer lower taxation than the poor voter. Our theory organizes a number of stylized facts across countries about taxation and redistribution, parties, and class representation in legislatures. We demonstrate that spending does not necessarily
increase when the number of legislators increases, as the standard common-pool intuition suggests, and that many policies aimed at increasing descriptive representation may have the opposite effect.
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