(Un-)intended effects of fiscal rules Heiko T. Burret, Lars P. Feld
By: Burret, Heiko T
.
Contributor(s): Feld, Lars P.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2018Subject(s): DERECHO TRIBUTARIO | POLITICA FISCAL | POLITICA DE GASTO PUBLICO | CICLOS ECONOMICOS | SUIZAOnline resources: Click here to access online
In:
European Journal of Political Economy n. 52, 2018, p. 166-191Summary: The paper investigates the fiscal effects of Swiss cantonal debt brakes by taking explicitly into account the rules’ coverage. An in-depth analysis provides unique evidence that suggests the
following: First, fiscal rules reduce public deficits. The effect is stronger the better the analyzed budget position corresponds with the variable targeted by the rules. Second, cantonal debt
brakes exhibit some unintended effects, i.e., an evasion into unconstrained accounts, emphasizing the importance of constraining all accounts. Third, the existence of political budget cycles depends on the institutional context, i.e., the timing of elections and the presence of debt brakes.
Fifth, cantonal debt brakes dampen the fiscal deterioration during unexpected deficit shocks by more rapid fiscal adjustments.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 1912/2018/52-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 1912/2018/52-1 |
Browsing IEF Shelves Close shelf browser
| No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | ||
| OP 1912/2018/51 European Journal of Political Economy | OP 1912/2018/51-1 Do fiscal rules constrain fiscal policy? | OP 1912/2018/52 European Journal of Political Economy | OP 1912/2018/52-1 (Un-)intended effects of fiscal rules | OP 1912/2018/52-2 Breaking the norms | OP 1912/2018/52-3 Does inequality constrain the power to tax? | OP 1912/2018/53 European Journal of Political Economy |
Disponible únicamente en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
Resumen.
The paper investigates the fiscal effects of Swiss cantonal debt brakes by taking explicitly into account the rules’ coverage. An in-depth analysis provides unique evidence that suggests the
following: First, fiscal rules reduce public deficits. The effect is stronger the better the analyzed budget position corresponds with the variable targeted by the rules. Second, cantonal debt
brakes exhibit some unintended effects, i.e., an evasion into unconstrained accounts, emphasizing the importance of constraining all accounts. Third, the existence of political budget cycles depends on the institutional context, i.e., the timing of elections and the presence of debt brakes.
Fifth, cantonal debt brakes dampen the fiscal deterioration during unexpected deficit shocks by more rapid fiscal adjustments.
Click on an image to view it in the image viewer
There are no comments for this item.