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The moral and fiscal implications of antiretroviral therapies for HIV in Africa by Paul Collier and Olivier Sterck

By: Collier, Paul.
Contributor(s): Sterck, Olivier.
Material type: ArticleArticlePublisher: 2018Subject(s): SIDA | MEDICAMENTOS | IMPUESTOS | ASPECTOS ETICOS Y MORALES | ÁFRICAOnline resources: Click here to access online In: Oxford Economic Papers v. 70, n. 2, April 2018, p. 353-374Summary: Thanks to antiretroviral therapies (ART), people living with HIV (PLHIV) can now have a near-normal life at a cost of a few hundred dollars per year. We postulate that given this new low cost of maintaining lives, there is a moral duty to rescue those who are infected. This obligation creates a financial quasi-liability which for some African countries is comparable to their debt-to-GDP ratios. We construct a model to show that expenditure on prevention can pre-empt some of these liabilities. However, even with optimal prevention the quasi-liability is likely to remain too high to be affordable for a significant number of African countries. Extending the model to two players, we show that if the international community accepts part of the quasi-liability, as it does, it should finance a broadly equal share of prevention and treatment of future infections to mitigate moral hazard and avoid sub-optimal investment in prevention.
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Thanks to antiretroviral therapies (ART), people living with HIV (PLHIV) can now have a near-normal life at a cost of a few hundred dollars per year. We postulate that given this new low cost of maintaining lives, there is a moral duty to rescue
those who are infected. This obligation creates a financial quasi-liability which for some African countries is comparable to their debt-to-GDP ratios. We construct a model to show that expenditure on prevention can pre-empt some of these liabilities.
However, even with optimal prevention the quasi-liability is likely to remain too high to be affordable for a significant number of African countries. Extending the model to two players, we show that if the international community accepts part of the quasi-liability, as it does, it should finance a broadly equal share of prevention and treatment of future infections to mitigate moral hazard and avoid sub-optimal investment in prevention.

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