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Why taxing executives' bonuses can Foster risk - taking behavior by Martin Grossmann, Markus Lang and Helmut Dietl

Material type: Article

ArticlePublisher: 2016Subject(s): BONOS

In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics : JITE p. 645-664

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Item type	Current location	Home library	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode
		IEF	OP 1533/2016/4 (Browse shelf)	Available		OP 1533/2016/4

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Previous	OP 1533/2015/4 Endogenous timing in tax and public - investment competition	OP 1533/2016/1 33rd International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics : Beyond Privity [ June 10 - 13, 2015, Edinburgh, United Kingdom ]	OP 1533/2016/3 Corruption and economic growth	OP 1533/2016/4 Why taxing executives' bonuses can Foster risk - taking behavior	OP 1533/2017/2-1 Prohibition versus taxation in corrupt environments	OP 1533/2017/3 Foreign direct investment and international R&D spillovers in OECD countries revisited	OP 1533/2018/2 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics: JITE	Next

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