Does fiscal decentralization constrain Leviathan ? new evidence from local property tax competition George R. Crowley, Russell S. Sobel
By: Crowley, George R
.
Contributor(s): Sobel, Russell S.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2011Subject(s): DESCENTRALIZACION FISCAL | COMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA | TRIBUTOS LOCALES | ESTADOS UNIDOS | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
Public Choice v. 149, n. 1-2, October 2011, p. 5-30
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 1443/2011/149/1/2-1 (Browse shelf) | Available |
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| OP 1443/2011/148/3/4-1 Government fragmentation versus fiscal decentralization and corruption | OP 1443/2011/148/3/4-2 Globalization, welfare regimes and social protection expenditurres in Western and Eastern European countries | OP 1443/2011/149/1/2 Public choice in a local government setting | OP 1443/2011/149/1/2-1 Does fiscal decentralization constrain Leviathan ? | OP 1443/2011/149/1/2-2 The impact of fiscal decentralization on economics performance in high -income OECD nations | OP 1443/2011/149/1/2-3 Do housing bubbles generate fiscal bubbles ? | OP 1443/2011/149/3/4 The many faces of counterterrorism |
Disponible en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
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