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Bureaucrats versus voters: on the political economy of resource allocation by direct democracy

Material type: Article

ArticlePublisher: 1979Subject(s): DEFICIT PUBLICO

In: Quarterly Journal of Economics vol. 93; nº, p. 563-587

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Item type	Current location	Home library	Call number	Status	Notes	Date due	Barcode
		IEF	OP 230/1979/3vr (Browse shelf)	Available	En: Quarterly Journal of Economic; v. 93;nº ; p. 563-587; 1979		OP 230/1979/3vr

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Previous	OP 230/1978/1 Shadow pricing, information , and stability in a simple open economy	OP 230/1978/1-2 The optimal taxation of comsumption externalities	OP 230/1978/1-3 Social institutions, imperfect information and the distribution of income	OP 230/1979/3vr Bureaucrats versus voters: on the political economy of resource allocation by direct democracy	OP 230/1979/4-1 The optimal taxation of foreign source investment income	OP 230/1979/4-2 Tax incidence in a life cycle model with variable labor suply	OP 230/1980/94/4 The effects of taxation on the selling of corporate stock and the realization of capital gains	Next

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