Optimal Income Taxtaion and Job Choice Robin Boadway, Zhen Song, Jean-François Tremblay
By: Boadway, Robin William
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Contributor(s): Song, Zhen | Tremblay, Jean François.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2017Subject(s): TRABAJO | IMPUESTOS | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics v. 119, n. 4, 2017, p. 910-938Summary: In this paper, we study optimal income taxation when different jobtypes exist for workers of different skills. Each job type has some feasible range of incomes from which workers choose by varying labor supply. Workers are more productive than others in the jobs that suit them best. The model combines features of the classic optimal tax literature with labor variability along the intensive margin, with the extensive-margin approach where workers make discrete job choices and/or participation decisions. We find that first-best maximin utility can be achieved in the second-best, and marginal tax rates below the top can be negative or zero.
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| OP 1376/2017/1 Intergenerational mobility | OP 1376/2017/2 A characteristics approach to optimal taxation | OP 1376/2017/3 Direct democracy and local public finances under cooperative federalism | OP 1376/2017/4 Optimal Income Taxtaion and Job Choice | OP 1376/2018/120/1 The Scandinavian Journal of Economics | OP 1376/2018/2 The Scandinavian Journal of Economics | OP 1376/2018/2-1 Corporate taxation and productivity catch-up |
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In this paper, we study optimal income taxation when different jobtypes exist for workers of different skills. Each job type has some feasible range of incomes from which workers choose by varying labor supply. Workers are more productive than others in the jobs that suit them best. The model combines features of the classic optimal tax literature with labor variability along the intensive margin, with the extensive-margin approach where workers make discrete job choices and/or participation decisions. We find that first-best maximin utility can be achieved in the second-best, and marginal tax rates below the top can be negative or zero.
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