The optimal deterrence of tax evasion the trade - off between information reporting and audits Yulia ( Paramonova ) Kuchumova
By: Kuchumova, Yulia
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2017Subject(s): INSPECCION TRIBUTARIA | AUDITORIA FISCAL | EVASION FISCAL | CONTROL | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS | CUMPLIMIENTO FISCAL | INFORMACION TRIBUTARIA
In:
Journal of public economics v. 145, January 2017, p. 162-180
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 730/2017/145-3 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 730/2017/145-3 |
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| OP 730/2016/144-2 Optimal taxation when people do not maximize well - being | OP 730/2017/145-1 Compulsory voting, turnout and government spending | OP 730/2017/145-2 The fiscal cost of weak governance | OP 730/2017/145-3 The optimal deterrence of tax evasion | OP 730/2017/146 Redistribution and insurance with simple tax instruments | OP 730/2018/157 Journal of Public Economics | OP 730/2018/157-1 Taxes, informality and income shifting |
Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
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