Optimal taxation when people do not maximize well - being Aart Gerritsen
By: Gerritsen, Aart
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2016Subject(s): IMPOSICION OPTIMA | REDISTRIBUCION | RENTA | BIENESTAR SOCIAL | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
Journal of public economics v. 144, December 2016, p. 122-139
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 730/2016/144-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 730/2016/144-2 |
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| OP 730/2016/143-3 Progressive taxation in a tournament economy | OP 730/2016/143-4 Effort, luck and voting for redistribution | OP 730/2016/144-1 Optimal tax mix with income tax non - compliance | OP 730/2016/144-2 Optimal taxation when people do not maximize well - being | OP 730/2017/145-1 Compulsory voting, turnout and government spending | OP 730/2017/145-2 The fiscal cost of weak governance | OP 730/2017/145-3 The optimal deterrence of tax evasion |
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