Desierto, Desiree A.
Prohibition versus taxation in corrupt environments / by Desiree A. Desierto and John V. C. Nye .-- , 2017
Disponible en línea a trevés de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Bibliografía. Resumen.
If corruption is rife and tolerated by society, prohibiting the production of a good with negative social costs may be more efficient at limiting quantity than legalizing and taxing producers. It becomes incentive-compatible for a corrupt government to enforce prohibition and credibly limit supply in order to extract bribesfrom illegal producers. In equilibrium, total quantity is low. In contrast, when thegood is legal and taxed, a corrupt government can extract rents only by expropriatingthe tax revenues. Thus, it prefers a larger market in order to generate more taxes, and quantity is higher. (JEL: D21, D23, H41)
CORRUPCION
CONTROL
POLITICA FISCAL
IMPUESTOS
Nye, Joseph S.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics : JITE p. 239-252
Prohibition versus taxation in corrupt environments / by Desiree A. Desierto and John V. C. Nye .-- , 2017
Disponible en línea a trevés de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Bibliografía. Resumen.
If corruption is rife and tolerated by society, prohibiting the production of a good with negative social costs may be more efficient at limiting quantity than legalizing and taxing producers. It becomes incentive-compatible for a corrupt government to enforce prohibition and credibly limit supply in order to extract bribesfrom illegal producers. In equilibrium, total quantity is low. In contrast, when thegood is legal and taxed, a corrupt government can extract rents only by expropriatingthe tax revenues. Thus, it prefers a larger market in order to generate more taxes, and quantity is higher. (JEL: D21, D23, H41)
CORRUPCION
CONTROL
POLITICA FISCAL
IMPUESTOS
Nye, Joseph S.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics : JITE p. 239-252