Konrad, Kai Andreas
The political economy of paternalism / Kai A. Konrad
Bibliografía
Some citizens place a high value on making decisions for themselves. Other citizens are happy to delegate decisions to a government agency. Such differences in political attitudes to paternalism can be explained in a strict rational-choice model with citizens’ heterogeneous tastes in the economic sphere. Citizens with more eccentric tastes and with high decision-making abilities tend to favor a libertarian regime. If majority preferences matter, heterogeneity in economic preferences and analytical abilities can also explain whether the political regime is more paternalist or more libertarian. As decision-making skills are a learnable capability, the strategic complementarity of individuals’ investments in analytical skills in the context of political regime outcomes suggests a feedback mechanism that can cause multiple expectations equilibria. Both a libertarian regime or a paternalist regime can emerge.
TOMA DE DECISIONES
ANALISIS ECONOMICO
ECONOMIA
REGIMENES POLITICOS
SOCIOLOGIA POLITICA
Public Choice 0048-5829 vol. 201, n.1-2 (octubre 2024) p. 61-81
The political economy of paternalism / Kai A. Konrad
Bibliografía
Some citizens place a high value on making decisions for themselves. Other citizens are happy to delegate decisions to a government agency. Such differences in political attitudes to paternalism can be explained in a strict rational-choice model with citizens’ heterogeneous tastes in the economic sphere. Citizens with more eccentric tastes and with high decision-making abilities tend to favor a libertarian regime. If majority preferences matter, heterogeneity in economic preferences and analytical abilities can also explain whether the political regime is more paternalist or more libertarian. As decision-making skills are a learnable capability, the strategic complementarity of individuals’ investments in analytical skills in the context of political regime outcomes suggests a feedback mechanism that can cause multiple expectations equilibria. Both a libertarian regime or a paternalist regime can emerge.
TOMA DE DECISIONES
ANALISIS ECONOMICO
ECONOMIA
REGIMENES POLITICOS
SOCIOLOGIA POLITICA
Public Choice 0048-5829 vol. 201, n.1-2 (octubre 2024) p. 61-81