Bierbrauer, Felix

Taxes and turnout when the decisive voter stays at home / Felix Bierbrauer, Aleh Tsyvinski, Nicolas Werquin .-- , 2022


Resumen.

Bibliografía.

We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turn-out and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized.


POLITICA FISCAL
REDISTRIBUCION
RENTA
PARTIDOS POLITICOS
VOTO
PARTICIPACION POLITICA
ESTADOS UNIDOS


Tsyvinski, Aleh
Werquin, Nicolas

The American Economic Review 0002-8282v. 112, n. 2, February 2022, p. 689-719

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