Emmenegger, Patrick
The politics of inequality as organised spectacle why the Swiss do not want to tax the rich / Patrick Emmenegger and Paul Marx .-- , 2019
Disponible también en formato electrónico.
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
In 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to imposea tax on the superrich in a popular vote and there by fund are distributive policy. However,alarge majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’
RIQUEZA
RENTAS ALTAS
IMPUESTOS
OPINION PUBLICA
GRUPOS DE INTERES ECONOMICO
SUIZA
Marx, Paul
New political economy 1356-3467v. 24, n. 1, February 2019, p. 103-124
The politics of inequality as organised spectacle why the Swiss do not want to tax the rich / Patrick Emmenegger and Paul Marx .-- , 2019
Disponible también en formato electrónico.
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
In 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to imposea tax on the superrich in a popular vote and there by fund are distributive policy. However,alarge majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’
RIQUEZA
RENTAS ALTAS
IMPUESTOS
OPINION PUBLICA
GRUPOS DE INTERES ECONOMICO
SUIZA
Marx, Paul
New political economy 1356-3467v. 24, n. 1, February 2019, p. 103-124