Kuzniacki, Blazej
The limitation on benefits (LOB) provision in BEPS Action 6/MLI ineffective overreaction of mind-numbing complexity : part 1 / Blazej Kuzniacki .-- , 2018
This two-part article addresses the usefulness of the limitation on benefits (LoB) rule in the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) Action 6 project and a Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (MLI) to prevent abusive treaty shopping - the most prevalent and typical form of treaty abuse. Although a certain flexibility in the prevention of treaty abuse was envisaged by BEPS Action 6/MLI, only twelve out of the sixty-eight Signatories to the Multilateral Instrument (MLI) have so far chosen to add the MLI's LoB rule to the principal purpose test (PPT). Such little interest in implementing the MLI's LoB rule may have something to do with its mind-numbing complexity. Or perhaps tax administrations simply prefer to have more discretionary power under the PPT? This study interrogates this unexplored research area by performing a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of abusive treaty shopping and the MLI's LoB rule. The overarching question pertains to the effectiveness of the MLI's LoB rule in the prevention of treaty shopping.
EROSIÓN DE LA BASE IMPONIBLE Y TRASLADO DE BENEFICIOS
ELUSION FISCAL
EVASION FISCAL
PREVENCIÓN
PROGRAMAS
APLICACION
ABUSO DE TRATADOS
BENEFICIARIO EFECTIVO
CONVENIO MULTILATERAL
Intertax 0165-2826 v. 46, n. 1, January 2018, p. 68-79
The limitation on benefits (LOB) provision in BEPS Action 6/MLI ineffective overreaction of mind-numbing complexity : part 1 / Blazej Kuzniacki .-- , 2018
This two-part article addresses the usefulness of the limitation on benefits (LoB) rule in the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) Action 6 project and a Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (MLI) to prevent abusive treaty shopping - the most prevalent and typical form of treaty abuse. Although a certain flexibility in the prevention of treaty abuse was envisaged by BEPS Action 6/MLI, only twelve out of the sixty-eight Signatories to the Multilateral Instrument (MLI) have so far chosen to add the MLI's LoB rule to the principal purpose test (PPT). Such little interest in implementing the MLI's LoB rule may have something to do with its mind-numbing complexity. Or perhaps tax administrations simply prefer to have more discretionary power under the PPT? This study interrogates this unexplored research area by performing a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of abusive treaty shopping and the MLI's LoB rule. The overarching question pertains to the effectiveness of the MLI's LoB rule in the prevention of treaty shopping.
EROSIÓN DE LA BASE IMPONIBLE Y TRASLADO DE BENEFICIOS
ELUSION FISCAL
EVASION FISCAL
PREVENCIÓN
PROGRAMAS
APLICACION
ABUSO DE TRATADOS
BENEFICIARIO EFECTIVO
CONVENIO MULTILATERAL
Intertax 0165-2826 v. 46, n. 1, January 2018, p. 68-79