Waseem, Mazhar
Taxes, informality and income shifting evidence from a recent Pakistani tax reform / Mazhar Waseem .-- , 2018
Disponible únicamente en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
This paper studies drivers’ responses to a ‘notched’ penalty scheme in which speeding penalties are stepwise and
discontinuously increasing in speed. We present survey evidence suggesting that drivers in Germany are well
aware of the notched penalty structure. Based on a simple analytical framework, we analyze the impact of the
notches on drivers’ optimal speed choices. The model’s predictions are confronted with data on more than
150,000 speeding tickets from the Autobahn and 290,000 speed measures from a traffic monitoring system. The data provide evidence on modest levels of bunching, despite several frictions working against it. We analyze the normative implications and assess the scope for welfare gains from moving from a simple, notched penalty scheme to a more complex but less salient Pigouvian scheme.
RENTA
IMPUESTOS
EFICIENCIA
EVASION FISCAL
PAKISTAN
Journal of Public Economics 0047-2727 n. 157, 2018, p. 41-77
Taxes, informality and income shifting evidence from a recent Pakistani tax reform / Mazhar Waseem .-- , 2018
Disponible únicamente en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
This paper studies drivers’ responses to a ‘notched’ penalty scheme in which speeding penalties are stepwise and
discontinuously increasing in speed. We present survey evidence suggesting that drivers in Germany are well
aware of the notched penalty structure. Based on a simple analytical framework, we analyze the impact of the
notches on drivers’ optimal speed choices. The model’s predictions are confronted with data on more than
150,000 speeding tickets from the Autobahn and 290,000 speed measures from a traffic monitoring system. The data provide evidence on modest levels of bunching, despite several frictions working against it. We analyze the normative implications and assess the scope for welfare gains from moving from a simple, notched penalty scheme to a more complex but less salient Pigouvian scheme.
RENTA
IMPUESTOS
EFICIENCIA
EVASION FISCAL
PAKISTAN
Journal of Public Economics 0047-2727 n. 157, 2018, p. 41-77