000			01676nab#a2200313#c#4500
003			IEF
005			20180219164015.0
008			170629s2017 DEU|| #####0 b|ENG|u
040			_aIEF
041			_aENG
100	1		_aKauder, Björn _964013
245			_aManipulating fiscal forecasts _b evidence from the German States _c Björn Kauder, Niklas Potrafke, Christoph Schinke
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
650		4	_aHACIENDAS REGIONALES _945243
650		4	_aFEDERALISMO FISCAL _944156
650		4	_aELECCIONES _943408
650		4	_aCAMPAÑAS ELECTORALES _955160
650		4	_aPOLITICA FISCAL _948067
650		4	_aGASTO PUBLICO REGIONAL _944855
650		4	_aALEMANIA _925193
520			_aWe examine whether German state governments manipulated fiscal forecasts beforeelections. Our data set includes three fiscal measures over the period 1980---2014. Theresults do not show that electoral motives influenced fiscal forecasts in West Germanstates. By contrast, East German state governments underestimated spending in preelection years (compared to other years) by about 0.20 percent of GDP, tax revenues byabout 0.36 percent of GDP, and net lending by 0.30 percent of GDP. Predicting low levelsof spending and tax revenues, East German state governments thus underestimated the size of government in preelection years.
700	1		_aPotrafke, Niklas _956372
700	1		_aSchinke, Christoph _965502
773	0		_tFinanzArchiv _w21244 _gv. 73, n. 2, June 2017, p. 213-236
942			_cART
942			_z148213
999			_c85593 _d85593