000			01593nab#a2200277#c#4500
999			_c68655 _d68655
003			IEF
005			20221102143546.0
008			171214s2017 GBR|| #####0 b|ENG|u
040			_aIEF _cES-MaBCM
041			_aENG
100	1		_aFaria e Castro, Miguel _965718
245			_aRuns versus Lemons _binformation disclosure and fiscal capacity _c Miguel Faria e Castro, Joseba Martínez and Thomas Philippon
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Bibliografía. Resumen. Conclusión.
520			_aWe study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops duringfinancial crises. Providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets, but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs. In ourmodel, governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons. A fiscal backstop mitigates the cost of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy.Our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informative stress tests, and, paradoxically, how theycan end up spending less than governments that are more fiscallyconstrained.
650		4	_aCAPACIDAD FISCAL _933515
650		4	_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_aCRISIS FINANCIERA _955516
650		4	_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776
700	1		_aMartínez, Joseba _964031
700	1		_aPhilippon, Thomas _954002
773	0		_tThe review of economic studies _w124405 _gv. 84 (3), n. 301, October 2017, p. 1683-1707
942			_cART _2udc
942			_2udc