| 000 | 01524nab#a2200301#c#4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | IEF | ||
| 005 | 20180612142040.0 | ||
| 008 | 170728s2017 GBR|| #####0 b|ENG|u | ||
| 040 | _aIEF | ||
| 041 | _aENG | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aPavoni, Nicola _964567 |
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| 245 |
_aIntergenerational disagreement and optimal taxation of parental transfers _c Nicola Pavoni and Hakki Yazici |
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| 260 | _c2017 | ||
| 500 | _aDisponible en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Bibliografía. Resumen. Conclusión. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_aTRANSMISION DE BIENES _948592 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aDONACIONES _942899 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aSUCESION _948504 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aIMPUESTOS _947460 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aIMPOSICION OPTIMA _97978 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776 |
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| 520 | _aWe study optimal taxation of bequests and inter vivos transfers ina model where altruistic parents and their offspring disagree on intertemporal trade-offs. We show that the laissez-faire equilibrium is Pareto inefficient, and whenever offspring are impatient from their parents. perspective, optimal policyinvolves a positive tax on parental transfers. Cautioned by the technical complications present in this class of models, our normative prescriptions do notrely on the assumption of differentiability of the agents.policy functions. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_944146 _aFAMILIA |
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| 700 | 1 |
_aYazici, Hakki _965567 |
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| 773 | 0 |
_tThe review of economic studies _w124405 _gv. 84 (3), n. 300, July 2017, p. 1264-1305 |
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| 942 | _cART | ||
| 942 | _z148346 | ||
| 999 |
_c68604 _d68604 |
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