000			01817nab#a2200289#c#4500
003			IEF
005			20190816110624.0
008			170728s2017 GBR|| #####0 b|ENG|u
040			_aIEF
041			_aENG
100	1		_aLandier, Augustin _965565
245			_aTaxing rich _c Augustin Landier and Guillaume Plantin
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Bibliografía. Resumen. Conclusión.
650		4	_aRIQUEZA _944024
650		4	_aRENTAS ALTAS _947319
650		4	_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_aEVASION FISCAL _944029
650		4	_aIMPOSICION OPTIMA _97978
520			_aAffluent households can respond to taxation with means that are not economically viable for therest of the population, such as sophisticated taxplans and international tax arbitrage. This article studies an economy in whichan inequality-averse social planner faces agents who have access to a tax-avoidancetechnology with subadditive costs, and who can shape the risk profile of their income as they see fit.Subadditive avoidance costs imply that optimal taxation cannot be progressive at the top. This in turn may trigger excessive risk-taking. When the avoidance technology consists in costly migration between two countries that compete fiscally, we show that an endogenous increase in inequality due to risk-taking makes progressive taxation more fragile, which vindicates in turn risk-taking and can lead to equilibria with regressive tax rates at the top, and high migrations of wealth towards the smaller country.
650		4	_943410 _aELUSION FISCAL
700	1		_aPlantin, Guillaume _965566
773	0		_tThe review of economic studies _w124405 _gv. 84 (3), n. 300, July 2017, p. 1186-1209
942			_cART
942			_z148345
999			_c68603 _d68603