| 000 | 01387nab#a2200265#c#4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | IEF | ||
| 005 | 20180219161859.0 | ||
| 008 | 170331s2017 USA|| #####0 b|ENG|u | ||
| 040 | _aIEF | ||
| 041 | _aENG | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aStratmann, Thomas _955208 |
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| 245 |
_aThe political economy of sales taxes and sales tax exemptions _c Thomas Stratmann |
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| 260 | _c2017 | ||
| 500 | _aDisponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía. Apéndice. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_aVENTAS _948680 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aIMPUESTOS INDIRECTOS _946528 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aEXENCIONES TRIBUTARIAS _944038 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aPOLITICA ECONOMICA _948066 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888 |
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| 520 | _aI analyze the choice politicians face when seeking votes from groups that lobby for sales tax rate decreases or tax exemptions, given the constraint that politicians want to raise a certain amount of revenue. Using data on sales taxes, I develop a model predicting a positive relationship between the number of exemptions and the sales tax rate. The estimation results provide support for this prediction. Each additional exemption is associated with an increase of between 0.10 and 0.25 percentage points in the tax rate. | ||
| 773 | 0 |
_tPublic Choice _w36930 _gv. 171, n. 1-2, April 2017, p. 207-221 |
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| 942 | _cART | ||
| 942 | _z147661 | ||
| 999 |
_c68588 _d68588 |
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