000			02025nab#a2200313#c#4500
003			IEF
005			20180219161021.0
008			170518s2017 DEU|| #####0 b|ENG|u
040			_aIEF
041			_aENG
100	1		_aJessen, Robin _965377
245			_aGetting the por to work _b three welfare - increasing reforms for a busy Germany _c Robin Jessen, Davud Rostam - Afschar and Viktor Steiner
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
650		4	_aRENTAS BAJAS _93605
650		4	_aRENTA BÁSICA _959338
650		4	_aTIPO LINEAL _948539
650		4	_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_aPOBREZA _948038
650		4	_aALEMANIA _925193
650		4	_aMODELOS DE SIMULACIÓN _947773
520			_aWe study three budget-neutral reforms of the German tax and transfer system designedto improve work incentives for people with low incomes: a feasible flat tax reform thatprovides a basic income equal to the current level of the means-tested unemploymentbenefit, and two alternative reforms that involve employment subsidies to stimulateparticipation and full-time work, respectively. We estimate labor supply reactions andwelfare effects using a microsimulation model based on household data from the Socio-Economic Panel and a structural labor supply model. We find that all three reforms increaselabor supply in the first decile of the income distribution. The flat tax scenario reduces overall labor supply by about 5%; the reform designed to increase participation reduces labor supply by 1%; the reform that provides incentives to work full-time has negligible effects on overall labor supply. With equal welfare weights, aggregate welfare gains are realizable under all three reforms.
700	1		_aRostam Afschar, Davud _965378
700	1		_aSteiner, Viktor _953430
773	0		_tFinanzArchiv _w21244 _gv. 73, n. 1, March 2017, p. 1-41
942			_cART
942			_z147951
999			_c61352 _d61352