| 000 | 01457nab#a2200265#c#4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | IEF | ||
| 005 | 20180219160947.0 | ||
| 008 | 170518s2017 DEU|| #####0 b|ENG|u | ||
| 040 | _aIEF | ||
| 041 | _aENG | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aDesierto, Desiree A. _965376 |
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| 245 |
_aProhibition versus taxation in corrupt environments _c by Desiree A. Desierto and John V. C. Nye |
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| 260 | _c2017 | ||
| 500 | _aDisponible en línea a trevés de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Bibliografía. Resumen. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_aCORRUPCION _941326 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aCONTROL _940745 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aPOLITICA FISCAL _948067 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aIMPUESTOS _947460 |
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| 520 | _aIf corruption is rife and tolerated by society, prohibiting the production of a good with negative social costs may be more efficient at limiting quantity than legalizing and taxing producers. It becomes incentive-compatible for a corrupt government to enforce prohibition and credibly limit supply in order to extract bribesfrom illegal producers. In equilibrium, total quantity is low. In contrast, when thegood is legal and taxed, a corrupt government can extract rents only by expropriatingthe tax revenues. Thus, it prefers a larger market in order to generate more taxes, and quantity is higher. (JEL: D21, D23, H41) | ||
| 700 | 1 |
_aNye, Joseph S. _931585 |
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| 773 | 0 |
_tJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics : JITE _gp. 239-252 |
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| 942 | _cART | ||
| 942 | _z147950 | ||
| 999 |
_c60906 _d60906 |
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