000			01494nab#a2200241#c#4500
003			IEF
005			20180219153655.0
008			170929s2017 DEU|| #####0 b|ENG|u
040			_aIEF
041			_aENG
100	1		_aParcero, Osiris J. _965664
245			_aOptimal national policies towards multinationals when local regions can choose between firm - specific and non - firm - specific policies _c Osiris J. Parcero
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
650		4	_aEMPRESAS MULTINACIONALES _943600
650		4	_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_aCOMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA _940318
520			_aThis paper looks at a country's optimal central-government optimalpolicy in a settingwhere its two identical local jurisdictions compete to attract footloose multinationals totheir sites, and where the considered ultinationals strictly prefer this country to the restof the world. For the sake of realism the model allows the local jurisdictions to choosebetween firm-specific and non-firm-specific policies. We show that the implementationof the jurisdictional firm-specific policy is weakly welfare dominant. Hence the frequentcalls for the central government to ban the former type of policies go against the adviceof this paper.
773	0		_tFinanzArchiv _w21244 _gv. 73, n. 3, September 2017, p. 292-316
942			_cART
942			_z148607
999			_c34313 _d34313