| 000 | 01218nab#a2200241#c#4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | IEF | ||
| 005 | 20180219153655.0 | ||
| 008 | 171214s2017 USA|| #####0 b|ENG|u | ||
| 040 | _aIEF | ||
| 041 | _aENG | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aOgawa, Hikaru _953171 |
|
| 245 |
_aStrategic delegation in asymmetric tax competition _c Hikaru Ogawa, TaikiSusa |
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| 260 | _c2017 | ||
| 500 | _aDisponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Bibliografía. Resumen. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_aCOMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA _940318 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aDEMOCRACIA _941808 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776 |
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| 520 | _aThis study examines asymmetric tax competition under representative democracy systems. The findings show that the degree of asymmetry between countries affects the result of elections in each country, where the citizens selecta policy-maker to set a tax rate for the country.In particular, under certainconditions, a decisive voter in the election can select a citizen whose share of the country.s capital is higher than the decisive voter.s own share. | ||
| 773 | 0 |
_tEconomics & _gPolitics ; v. 29, n. 3, November 2017, p. 237-251 |
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| 942 | _cART | ||
| 942 | _z149249 | ||
| 999 |
_c34311 _d34311 |
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