000			01955nab#a2200265#c#4500
999			_c34294 _d34294
003			IEF
005			20221026183453.0
008			170623s2017 GBR|| #####0 b|ENG|u
040			_aIEF _cES-MaBCM
041			_aENG
100	1		_aWeisstanner, David _965491
245			_aThe fiscal benefits of repeated cooperation _bcoalitions and debt dynamics in 36 democracies _c David Weisstanner
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
520			_aDo coalition governments really suffer from short time horizons infiscal policymaking, as posited by standard political-economy models? This article focusses on coalitions that have created high levels of familiarity through sharedgoverning experiences in the past and that are likely to cooperate againin future governing coalitions. I argue that such coalitions have incentives tointernalise the future costs of debt accumulation and reach credible agreementsto balance their constituencies. fiscal preferences. Moreover, sustaining broadcoalitions should have electoral advantages to implementing controversial economic reforms, thusresulting in lower debt increases compared not only with lessdurable coalitions but also with single-party governments. Comparing 36 economically advanced democracies between (up to) 1962 and 2013, I estimate the effectsof coalitions.cooperation prospects on the dynamics of public debt. The findings indicate that long time horizons can help coalitions to overcome intertemporalcoordination problems and to reach specific policy goals.
650		4	_aPARTIDOS POLITICOS _947972
650		4	_aPOLITICA FISCAL _948067
650		4	_aNEGOCIACION _947823
650		4	_aDEUDA PUBLICA _942647
650		4	_aGOBIERNO _944995
773	0		_tJournal of Public Policy _w17584 _gv. 37, n. 2, June 2017, p. 143-172
942			_cART _2udc
942			_2udc