000			02070nab#a2200313#c#4500
003			IEF
005			20200203184359.0
008			170404s2017 USA|| #####0 b|ENG|u
040			_aIEF
041			_aENG
100	1		_aYang, James G. S. _962444
245			_aApple's tax debacle in Ireland _c James G.S. Yang and Leonard J. Lauricella
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión.
650		4	_aEMPRESAS MULTINACIONALES _943600
650		4	_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_aGASTOS FISCALES _950212
650		4	_aAYUDA ESTATAL _932236
650		4	_aINCUMPLIMIENTO DEL DERECHO COMUNITARIO _953911
650		4	_aTAX RULINGS _965151
650		4	_aIRLANDA _946671
650		4	_aUNION EUROPEA _948644
520			_aOn August 30, 2016, the European Commission (the Commission) concluded that Apple Inc. had been granted tax benefits by Ireland that gave it a competitive advantage over other businesses. The Commission claimed that this was aviolation of European Union (E.U.) state aid rules, and the government of Ireland was ordered to collect from Apple up to .13 billion plus interest (approximately $14.3 billion) representing an underpayment of tax for the period from 2003 until 2014. The crux of the Commission.s argument was the impact of two rulings by Ireland that had the effect of allowing Apple to earn large amounts of incomein Europe that was not subject to tax in any jurisdiction. This was deemed to be a violation of the principle that a state has the right to tax income earned within its jurisdiction measured under an arm.s-length principle. The authors describe Apple's operations in Europe and how it was able to achieve such tax favorable results. They then discuss the Commission.s attack on Apple's structure, and Apple's potential defense.
700	1		_aLauricella, Leonard J. _962443
773	0		_tJournal of Taxation of Investments _w51921 _gv. 34, n. 3, Spring 2017, p. 15-28
942			_cART
942			_z147664
999			_c34280 _d34280