000			01636nab a2200253 c 4500
999			_c150884 _d150884
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20250703121231.0
007			ta
008			250703t2025 xxk||||| |||| 00| 0eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_972714 _aCampolmi, Alessia
245	1	0	_aTrade and domestic policies under monopolistic competition _c Alessia Campolmi, Harald Fadinger, Chiara Forlati
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aShould trade agreements constrain domestic policies? We analyse this question using a model with monopolistic competition and constant-elasticity-of-substitution demand. We develop a welfare decomposition to show that welfare changes induced by trade and domestic policies can be decomposed into consumption and production efficiencies and terms-of-trade effects. We analyse the reasons to sign trade agreements and compare shallow and deep trade agreements, modelled according to GATT-WTO rules. Under monopolistic competition, unlike deep trade agreements, shallow agreements with market access commitments may not achieve efficiency because terms of trade can be improved without reducing market access by increasing the set of foreign firms selling domestically.
650		4	_938116 _aCOMERCIO
650		4	_943194 _aECONOMIAS DE ESCALA
650		4	_948051 _aPOLITICA COMERCIAL
650		4	_948061 _aPOLITICA INTERNACIONAL
650		4	_96729 _aACUERDOS COMERCIALES
700	1		_972715 _aFadinger, Harald
700	1		_972716 _aForlati, Chiara
773	0		_9173598 _oOP 282/2025/667 _tThe Economic Journal _w(IEF)330 _x 0013-0133 [papel] _g v. 135, n. 667, April 2025, p. 892-913
942			_cART