000			01923nab a2200253 c 4500
999			_c150790 _d150790
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20250616134627.0
007			ta
008			250616t2025 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_963777 _aAgrawal, David R.
245	1	0	_aTax competition with intermunicipal cooperation _c David R. Agrawal, Marie-Laure Breuillé, and Julie Le Gallo
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe study local tax competition when municipalities can voluntarily cooperate. We compare the intensity of interjurisdictional policy interdependence between competing municipalities within the same “establishment for intermunicipal cooperation” (EIMC) and competing municipalities outside of the cooperative unit. To resolve the endogeneity of the decision to cooperate, we apply the approach of Kelejian and Piras. The strategic response to the average tax rate among peer members of the same EIMC is less intense than the response to the average tax rate of municipalities outside of the cooperative unit. A 1 percentage point decrease in the average tax rate of nonmembers lowers the own-jurisdiction tax rate by 0.58 percentage points, while a 1-unit decrease in the tax rate of towns within the EIMC lowers the own-jurisdiction rate by 0.31 percentage points. Our empirical methods can be used to study strategic interactions within other cooperative groups, including supranational institutions such as the European Union.
650		4	_940318 _aCOMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA
650		4	_965072 _aCOOPERACIÓN INTERTERRITORIAL
650		4	_953408 _aANÁLISIS DE REGRESIÓN
650		4	_945217 _aHACIENDAS LOCALES
650		4	_963689 _aCUMPLIMIENTO COOPERATIVO
700			_953646 _aBreuillé, Marie Laure
700	1		_972664 _aLe Gallo, Julie
773	0		_9173540 _oOP 233/2025/1 _tNational Tax Journal _w(IEF)86491 _x 0028-0283 _g v.78, n.1, march 2025, p. 5-43
942			_cART