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_c150555 _d150555 |
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| 003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
| 005 | 20250401144659.0 | ||
| 007 | ta | ||
| 008 | 250401t2025 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
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| 100 | 1 |
_972511 _aKang, Hyewon |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aCan fiscal transparency mitigate political budget cycles? _c Hyewon Kang |
| 504 | _aBibliografía | ||
| 520 | _aThis study investigates the impact of fiscal transparency on the political budget cycle (PBC) using U.S. State government data from 1991 to 2018. Employing a dynamic panel model, we test whether fiscal transparency mitigates PBC and influences expenditure composition in election years. A fiscal transparency index is constructed, encompassing the comprehensiveness of budget documents, legislature oversight, and the public availability of online financial information. Results indicate that fiscal transparency mitigates the PBC effects on total expenditure. Additionally, our results suggest a shift in expenditure composition from welfare to health and police spending during election years, supporting the PBC models’ hypothesis that incumbents prioritize visible spending. This study contributes to the conditional PBC literature by shedding light on the role of fiscal transparency. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_948131 _aPRESUPUESTOS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_948593 _aTRANSPARENCIA FISCAL |
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| 650 | 4 |
_947460 _aIMPUESTOS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_944856 _aGASTOS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_942888 _aESTADOS UNIDOS |
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| 773 | 0 |
_9173284 _oOP 1443/2025/1/2 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g v.202, n.1-2, January 2025, p.141-166 |
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| 942 | _cART | ||