000			01791nab a2200241 c 4500
999			_c150412 _d150412
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20250313103241.0
007			ta
008			250313t2024 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_920012 _aGupta, Sanjeev
245	1	0	_aPolitics in reforming taxes _bevidence from developing countries _c Sanjeev Gupta, João Tovar Jalles
504			_aBibliografía
520			_aThis paper empirically assesses the role of political variables in the implementation of tax reforms in a sample of 45 emerging market and low-income economies over the 2000-2015 period. The existing literature identifies several hypotheses that could drive reforms, but empirical studies that support these hypotheses are lacking. Using a narrative database of tax reforms and by means of binary-type models, our results suggest that a left-wing government is less inclined to implement tax reforms while both proximity to elections and political strength or cohesion are positively associated with tax reforms. The influence of the left government is stronger in low-income than in emerging market economies and revenue administration reforms are resisted the most by such governments. Proximity to elections seems to trigger reforms of personal income tax (PIT) but opposite holds for trade tax reforms. Political cohesion is a necessary ingredient to reform most tax categories and revenue administration.
650		4	_948067 _aPOLITICA FISCAL
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
650		4	_943408 _aELECCIONES
650		4	_948047 _aPOLITICA
650		4	_945520 _aIDEOLOGIAS
700			_960498 _aJalles, João Tovar
773	0		_9172612 _oOP 207/2024/3 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _g v. 80, n. 3, September 2024, p. 303-331
942			_cART