000 | 01476nab a2200205 c 4500 | ||
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999 |
_c150405 _d150405 |
||
003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
005 | 20250311131647.0 | ||
007 | ta | ||
008 | 250311t2024 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
||
245 | 0 | 0 |
_aSeeking professional help _bhow paid preparers decrease tax compliance _c Jason DeBacker ... [et al.] |
504 | _aBibliografĂa | ||
520 | _aLegal services, such as tax preparation, claim to help clients better comply with the law while maximizing their benefits. We test this claim using data from about 135,000 random audits conducted by the US Internal Revenue Service between 2006 and 2014. Supplementing this nationally representative cross section of data on tax compliance with an instrumental-variable approach, we find that tax preparers actually reduce compliance, increasing taxpayers’ underreporting of income by roughly $3,900 per tax return. However, we find that volunteer tax preparers assisting low-income taxpayers have compliance rates similar to self-prepared returns, suggesting that differences in clientele or pecuniary incentives can affect the relationship between tax-preparation services and tax compliance. | ||
650 | 4 |
_944029 _aEVASION FISCAL |
|
650 | 4 |
_941016 _aINSPECCION TRIBUTARIA |
|
650 | 4 |
_931098 _aASESORES FISCALES |
|
700 |
_964104 _aDeBacker, Jason |
||
773 | 0 |
_9172702 _oOP 233/2024/2 _tNational Tax Journal _w(IEF)86491 _x 0028-0283 _g v.77, n.2, June 2024, p. 223-261 |
|
942 | _cART |